Gates Admits to 'Misjudgments,' But Says He Is Fit to Lead C.I.A.
By Elaine Sciolino
Given a rare second chance to become Director of Central Intelligence, Robert M. Gates opened Senate confirmation hearings today by presenting himself as both contrite supplicant and seasoned Presidential adviser, a man who deserves the job as the nation's intelligence chief. In an effort to defuse still-explosive questions about his role in the Iran-contra affair, which sank his nomination to the same post in 1987, Mr. Gates said he had made a number of mistakes in not pursuing the possibility of impropriety or wrongdoing in the Government and would now be more aggressive in trying to prevent any similar activities. [ Excerpts, page A16. ] "I want to speak about the misjudgments that I made and the lessons I learned," Mr. Gates, the deputy national security adviser, told the Senate Intelligence Committee, reading from handwritten notes that he said he drafted Sunday night. "I should have done more." Over and over, when committee members asked him why he had not done more in specific instances, he said simply that he should have done more. Speaking under oath in a controlled tone, he added: "I should have been more skeptical of what I was told. I should have asked more questions and I should have been less satisfied with the answers I received, especially from Director Casey." Accused of 'Willful Ignorance' But he assured the committee members that they would not find a nominee "more aware of and sensitive to the lessons of that time or more understanding of the importance of a good-faith relationship with the Congress." During the summer and fall of 1986, as the Iran-contra affair was still unfolding in secret, Mr. Gates served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and William J. Casey was the Director. Mr. Gates said four years ago that he had not pursued information about the affair, in part because Mr. Casey had assured him nothing improper was going on. Despite Mr. Gates's comments today, Democratic members of the committee wasted no time in pressing him about when he first learned about the secret sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of the profits to the Nicaraguan rebels, and why he had failed to pursue the information he had. Mr. Gates maintained, as he did in his 1987 confirmation hearings, that he was aware of only fragmentary information about the affair until it was publicly disclosed in late November 1986. "You were absolutely surrounded by the truth," Senator Howard Metzenbaum said. "The question is, how could you possibly not know? As No. 2 man at the agency, such willful ignorance is inexcusable." The Ohio Democrat noted that the nominee had said in response to 33 written questions from the committee that he could not recall events related to the Iran-contra affair. "I hope your memory improves during the course of these hearings," Mr. Metzenbaum said. Casey on Spot as Well As Mr. Gates's appearance extended into the evening, it was difficult to tell whether he was gaining or losing ground with the committee, which appeared inclined but far from committed to approving his nomination when the hearings began. Of the 15 panel members, those who seemed most skeptical were Senators Metzenbaum, Dennis DeConcini, Democrat of Arizona, and Bill Bradley, Democrat of New Jersey. From the outset the hearings were as much a trial of Mr. Casey as they were an examination of Mr. Gates, with Senator David L. Boren, the Oklahoma Democrat who heads the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, starting off with dozens of queries about the minutiae of Iran-contra. For the first time, the 47-year-old Mr. Gates, who in his February 1987 testimony opened his prepared remarks with a paean of praise for Mr. Casey, today put some distance between himself and his former boss, mentor and protector. "However close we may have been professionally," Mr. Gates said of Mr. Casey, who died of a brain tumor in May 1987, "there was really, despite some of the things that have been written, a certain distance in a personal relationship. Mr. Casey was almost 30 years older than I was at the time, a different generation." Gates's Plan for Agency A number of committee members stressed that they would use this week's hearings to explore questions about the future of the C.I.A. and whether Mr. Gates is the right man to guide the agency into an era when cold war intelligence activities are outdated. In his prepared testimony, Mr. Gates offered a brief outline of what he would do if confirmed. He said that he would recommend that President Bush begin a major effort to determine the intelligence needs of the country for the next decade, would substantially expand the number of experts who gather intelligence and work to improve the relevance of intelligence to policymakers, and the relationship between the C.I.A. and the military. Mr. Gates, apparently suggesting he would alter some C.I.A. operations, told the committee, "We must consider the implications for our covert action capabilities of a dramatic decline in Soviet aggressiveness and disruptive activities in the third world." But today's hearings were dominated by the past. At a news conference in the Rose Garden this afternoon, President Bush expressed irritation with the way the Iran-contra scandal has dogged his Administration. "I wish the damned thing had never happened," the President said when asked if he, like Mr. Gates, wished he had done more to learn the details of the scandal. 'A Lot of Hindsight' But he declined to comment specifically on Mr. Gates's testimony today, saying he had not yet read it. "From any summary of what's been said, I have no feeling that his chances have been diminished and, indeed, my support for him will not waver," Mr. Bush said. "But I suppose what he's saying, if that's it, is that with a lot of hindsight and a lot of things that have come to the surface since, maybe he wished he had done things differently. I guess we all might fit into that description." In his 1987 Senate testimony, Mr. Gates said that "nobody ever accused me of being slow," and his presentation today showed an extraordinary deference to the committee and the process of Congressional oversight on intelligence matters. He vowed to build a relationship of "trust and confidence" with Congress if he is confirmed, and to resign from the job of Director rather than jeopardize that relationship because of differences with the executive branch or the C.I.A. In 1987, by contrast, when Mr. Gates was pressed repeatedly by committee members about what he would do if the President prevented him from reporting to Congress, he said only that he would "contemplate resignation." But Mr. Gates's continued assertions in written answers to the committee that he had only vague information about the Iran-contra affair led some Democrats on the panel to question his candor. Senator Bradley offered the most relentless critique of Mr. Gates, accusing the nominee of "lapses of judgment." The committee will have to decide, he said, whether they were "isolated mistakes or part of a pattern in which Mr. Gates tailored intelligence to suit policymakers or his own biases, failed to prevent, protest or at least warn of improperly authorized activities or even suppressed damaging information." A More Personal Tone As one example, Mr. Bradley said that the Iran-contra affair began with "an error of judgment," namely what he called "a badly flawed estimate" in 1985 of Iranian vulnerability by the National Intelligence Council, the most senior body of intelligence analysts, which Mr. Gates headed. Unlike in his 1987 testimony, Mr. Gates today infused his answers with an emotional and personal tone. He said he was "humbled" by the honor of the nomination and described himself as a loyal public servant who came to Washington 25 years ago with all of his possessions: "a 1965 Mustang and no money." He also sought to defuse criticism about his pessimistic views of the Soviet Union since the coming to power of Mikhail S. Gorbachev in the spring of 1985, and his failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. "Who would have thought just five years ago we would stand where we are today -- certainly not the intelligence analyst sitting before you today," Mr. Gates said. "Talk about humbling experiences." But the senators repeatedly returned to questions and allegations about Mr. Gates's knowledge of the Iran-contra affair. Mr. Gates said that he had "no recollection" of a conversation in late August 1986 with Richard Kerr, the current Acting Director of Central Intelligence who was one of Mr. Gates's immediate subordinates, in which Mr. Kerr says he told his boss of the affair. "I've never denied Mr. Kerr may have broached this subject with me," Mr. Gates said. "I've simply said that I have no recollection of it myself." When asked about a sworn statement by Mr. Kerr's top assistant, John Helgerson, that Mr. Kerr also told him about his conversation with Mr. Gates, the nominee conceded, "I would regard Mr. Helgerson's recollection as adding weight to the fact that Mr. Kerr did in fact come to me." He was also asked about allegations that the Reagan Presidential campaign in 1980 tried to delay the release of 52 American hostages held in Teheran until after the November election. He said he had no knowledge of or involvement in such a plan.
